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DARBINIEKU FINANSIĀLĀS 
LĪDZDALĪBAS UZŅĒMUMOS 
TEORĒTISKIE ASPEKTI 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF 
EMPLOYEE FINANCIAL 
PARTICIPATION IN ENTERPRISES 
 
Anotācija 
Mūsdienu ekonomiskā doma nereti aplūko 
peļņu kā atlīdzību ne tikai faktoru „kapitāls” un 
„uzņēmējs” sagādātājiem, bet arī faktora 
„darbs” sagādātājiem uzņēmumā. Metode, ar 
kuras palīdzību tiek panākta šāda labumu 
sadale, ir darbinieku finansiāla līdzdalība. Tai 
piemīt dažādas formas – peļņdalība, kapitāldaļu 
īpašumtiesības, uzkrāšanas modeļi, prēmēšanas 
sistēmas. Šajā rakstā tiek aplūkoti darbinieku 
finansiālās līdzdalības teorētiskie un praktiskie 
aspekti uzņēmumos. 
Atslēgvārdi: darbinieku finansiālā līdzdalība, 
ražošanas faktori, peļņdalība, kapitāldaļu 
īpašumtiesības. 
 
Abstract 
The contemporary ideas suggest the profit 
sharing not only among the capital and the 
enterprise, but the labor as well. The way how 
to put into effect this approach to wealth 
distribution is employee financial participation. 
There may be several forms of employee 
financial participation – profit sharing, share 
ownership, saving schemes, gain sharing. This 
paper will analyze theoretical background and 
practical issues of employee financial 
participation in enterprises. 
Keywords: employee financial participation, 
factors of production, profit sharing, share 
ownership, saving schemes. 
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Introduction 
A neoclassical approach considers that there are three factors of 
production – land, labor and capital. Due to the contribution of J.A. 
Schumpeter and other representatives of Austrian school in the XX century, 
the modern approach assumes four factors of production – entrepreneurship 
besides the three mentioned above. Entrepreneurship (or entrepreneur –
spirit – Unternehmergeist, using the term of Schumpeter) is a factor of 
production in a sense of ability to bear the risk. The reward for the factors is: 
rent for the land, wage for the labor, dividends from the profit for the capital 
and economic profit for the enterprise. Consequently profit is shared among 
the holders of capital and the entrepreneurs (which usually, but not 
necessarily are the holders of the capital). But the profit in a large degree 
depends also from the motivation of employees as the holders of the labor. 
The contemporary ideas suggest the profit sharing not only among the 
capital and the enterprise, but the labor as well. The way how to put into 
effect this approach to wealth distribution is employee financial 
participation. There may be several forms of employee financial 
participation – profit sharing, share ownership, saving schemes, gain sharing 
and many others. 
Thus, this paper attempts to analyze both economic and social aspects 
of nowadays problems in enterprises. Provision of factors of production 
should be properly and fairly compensated. In this paper author will discuss 
aspects of profit distribution. From the non-employees representing 
entrepreneur’s position introduction of employee financial participation 
schemes can also be beneficial as it evolves strong motivation and loyalty for 
company’s employees. Thus, theoretically, companies can achieve at the 
same time both increase of efficiency and solve ethical problem of fair 
distribution of company’s profit.  
The paper is limited to theoretical aspects of employee financial 
participation. There will not appear analysis and discussion about particular 
participation schemes. 
The aim of this paper is to overview and to analyze different 
approaches to profit distribution and factors of production in the history of 
economic thought and to find rational economic justification for employee 
financial participation in enterprises. 
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Physiocrats and Factors of Production 
If we have a look at the early schools of economic thought we find that 
in Physiocracy the productive process is treated as the interaction between 
participating classes of the population. And as a result these classes are the 
factors of production, according to physiocratists.  
They are following: 
 The farmer labors on land (sometimes using "crafts") to produce 
food. 
 The artisan labors to produce capital goods (crafts) to be used by 
the other economic actors. 
 The landlord is only a consumer of food and crafts and produces 
nothing at all. 
 The merchant labors to export the food in exchange for foreign 
imports. 
Economic theories of physiocratists were first described in Francois 
Quesney's Tableau Economique, which was published in 1759. 
The Physiocrats, especially Turgot, believed that self-interest was the 
motivating reason for each segment of the economy to play its role. Each 
individual was best suited to determine what goods he wanted and what 
work would provide him with what he wanted out of life. While a person 
might labor for the benefit of others, he will work harder for the benefit of 
himself; however, each person's needs are being supplied by many other 
people. The system works best when there is a complementary relationship 
between one person's needs and another person's desires, and trade 
restrictions place an unnatural barrier to achieving one's goals. 
The theories concerning the value of land could not work without 
strong legal support for the ownership of private property. Combined with 
the strong sense of individualism, private property becomes a critical 
component of the functioning of productive process according to 
physiocrats. 
Both Quesnay and Turgot recognized that capital was needed by farmers 
to start the production process, and both were proponents of using some of 
each year's profits to increase productivity. Capital was also needed to 
sustain the laborers while they produced their product. Turgot recognizes 
that there is opportunity cost and risk involved in using capital for 
something other than land ownership, and he promotes interest as serving a 
"strategic function in the economy". 
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Classical and Neoclassical Economics Approach 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo as a representatives of classical 
economics school focuses on physical resources when defining factors of 
production, and discuss the distribution of cost/value among these factors. 
referred to the "component parts of price" (Adam Smith, 1776) as: 
 Land - naturally-occurring goods such as water, air, soil, minerals, 
flora and fauna that are used in the creation of products. The 
payment for use of land and the received income of a land owner is 
rent. 
 Labour- human effort used in production which also includes 
technical and marketing expertise. The payment for someone elses 
labor and all income received from ones own labor is wage. 
 Capital- human-made goods (means of production) which are used 
in the production of other goods. These include machinery, tools 
and buildings. The classical economists employed the word 
“capital” in reference to money (gold) also. Money however was 
not considered to be a factor of production in the sense of capital 
stock. The return to loaned money or to loaned stock was styled as 
interest while the return to the actual proprietor of capital stock 
(tools, etc) was styled as profit. 
 
Neoclassical economics continued the distinction of land, labor, and 
capital. It developed an alternative theory of value and distribution. 
A core proposition in neoclassical economics is that the income earned 
by each factor of production (essentially, “labor” and "capital") is equal to its 
marginal product. Thus, the wage is alleged to be equal to the marginal 
product of labor, and the rate of profit or rate of interest equals to the 
marginal product of capital. A second core proposition is that a change in the 
price of a factor of production, for example, a fall in the rate of profit, will 
lead to more of that factor being used in production. A fall in this price 
means that more will be used since the law of diminishing returns implies 
that greater use of this input will imply a lower marginal product. 
 
Emergence of production factor “entrepreneurship” or 
“entrepreneur-spirit”: new challenges  
Still, in many textbooks on economics, four factors of production are 
listed: land, labor, capital and the entrepreneur. Many economists priding 
themselves on being pragmatists, viewing our economy as a whole, and 
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judging the incentives which increase what is called "gross national product" 
also list the entrepreneur as a factor in production. 
Table 1 
Common Contemporary Approach to Factors of Production and Compensation for 
their Provision 
 
Factor of Production Land Labor Capital Entrepreneur
Compensation rent wage interest profit 
 
According to Goldfinger (1957), if there are four factors in production, 
there will correspondingly be four avenues of distribution which many 
economists list as rent, wages, interest and profit. The argument that 
"profits" over and above normal or average rent, wages and interest in an 
enterprise are only the wages of management is discounted by many 
economists due to the fact that the true managers, the managerial class, are 
employees and in the decisions made to take risks have but a minor 
influence. We may argue with these economists that the wages of 
management reach to the highest levels, but their arguments then will 
compare the "profits" of risk-taking, uncertainty and innovation employed 
by entrepreneurs to the "commercial interest" paid for the loan of capital 
where the risk of loss and the erosion of the loaned capital (machines) 
increases the amount of true economic interest. 
Risk-taking and erosion of capital must be and are compensated for in 
commercial transactions. Economists Frank H. Knight in his book Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit (1921) and Professor Joseph Schumpeter, the sage of 
Harvard in his book The Theory of Economic Development (1934) develop the 
theory that the uncertainty of the market and the necessity to plan 
production to meet market requirements, make all decisions bear the 
uncertainty of gain or loss, and this uncertainty, in the long trend, must be 
compensated in the enjoyment of profits. 
Schumpeter opposed the existing views of the entrepreneur as a risk 
bearer and a manager of a company. He argued that an entrepreneur is an 
innovator – an individual who carries out one of the following five tasks: 
 (1) the creation of a new good or a new quality; 
 (2) the creation of a new method of production; 
 (3) the opening of a new market; 
 (4) the capture of a new source of supply; 
 (5) the creation of a new organization or industry. 
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The entrepreneurial task is thus to identify new combinations and react 
to these by exercising the leadership to profit from them. 
The entrepreneur is not (necessarily) the one who invents new 
combinations but the one who identifies how these new combinations can 
be applied in production.  
Schumpeter argued that profit is a reward for innovation by the 
entrepreneur. The innovation gives the entrepreneur an advantage over his 
rivals, which enables him through the use of new methods, machines or 
techniques to earn a profit for him. 
Professor Ludwig Von Mises, declared that if "single-tax" were in full 
operation in the nineteenth century, our lands in the middle west and far 
west would not have been populated and used, because if all the excess of 
production above the product of labor on the poorest land in use were 
collected for public use, the incentive to endure the hardships of frontier life 
would not have existed, since no economic advantage would be enjoyed by 
frontiersmen. 
That is why we can question how can we continue to maintain that 
there are but three factors in production and three avenues of distribution? 
We do know that the rapid development making economy productive in the 
world, and making the best use of available resources and man-power, is 
largely the result of the quest for "profits," not wages. 
The Horatio Alger stories of the rise from rags to riches, the success 
stories, the legends of the golden opportunities of America, were all 
garnished with the individual successes of "self-made" men who reaped 
handsome harvests for their ingenuity, their willingness to take risks, plus 
their efficient efforts (Goldfinger, 1957). 
Goldfinger asks whether we are "horse and buggy" in our economics or 
can we still square observable facts within our concept of three factors in 
production and distribution? If we take the trouble to identify properly what 
we mean by "rent", we can readily show Professors Knight, Schumpeter, Von 
Mises and others that "profits" are actually the wages of management and 
that the compensation for risk-taking and innovation are part of 
management, and can be properly compensated. 
It should be examined Dr. Von Mises' claim that the collection of all of 
the excess production above the margin would rob the incentive to enter 
virgin lands and endure the privations of new settlements. Did Henry 
George mean, do we mean, by equality of opportunity equality of income? 
No, but, exacting as rent the whole of the excess productivity of land above 
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the margin would result in the same wages for all and thus make plausible 
Von Mises' observation unless we had a yardstick to help us determine, 
equitably and justly, exactly how much of the excess productivity should be 
collected for public use. 
If a forty-work-week is considered normal or general, and if one worker 
desires to work on his land eighty hours a week, thus raising the 
productivity, to take from him the excess productivity of his extra labor 
would seem to be confiscation of private property. Nor did Ricardo in his law 
of rent, or Henry George in his adoption of Ricardo's law, have such 
consequences in mind. Ricardo stated in his law of rent that "for the 
application of the same labor on each" the excess productivity of land above 
the margin was rent. The qualification "of the same labor" is our yard-stick. 
If a forty-hour-workweek is general, then the labor of forty hours at the 
margin and above the margin should fix the rent of the more productive 
land. 
But individuals vary in their productivity for the same hours of labor. 
Should the excess productivity of the more proficient or gifted worker be 
collected, as well as the excess productivity of a less efficient worker in the 
rent of land? Surely, Ricardo and George had in mind a common yardstick 
regardless of the differences in human productivity. If the rent of land were 
the excess produced by a worker of general skill, working the usually 
accepted hours of labor on land above the margin, society would be 
compensated for the exclusive use made by such a worker. 
One more skilful, having greater genius, willing to take risks, using his 
ingenuity, upon paying the normal rent for the use of better land would then 
be entitled to all that his greater productivity could produce beyond the 
payment of his rent. 
Thus incentive is encouraged. Thus the increase in production by the 
use of innovation demonstrated by Schumpeter is preserved while society is 
benefited by the equality of opportunity to access to land which the 
collection of the rental value of land would insure. 
While, in general, we quote Ricardo and George and advocate the 
collection of rental value of land, we should always be aware of the fact that 
economic rent does not mean all of the excess productivity of land above the 
margin, but does mean all of the excess for a given amount and quality of 
labor, and that amount and quality is what generally prevails in the 
community. 
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Thus entrepreneurs are but laborers of a higher quality of labor, and 
what recompense they receive is wages for a greater amount of labor or labor 
of higher productivity. Thus, three factors of production and distribution 
fully account for all the wealth produced and distributed among its factors. 
 
Economic Background for Employee Financial Participation 
If we agree with classical and neo-classical schools and Goldfinger and 
assume that there are still just three factors of production and they fully 
account for all the wealth produced and distributed among these factors, we 
should still ask then and debate where the profits should go and who will 
gain from growing market value of the enterprise over the time? Will it be 
land, capital or labor or some combination? Who is responsible for profits 
and growing value of company? It is clear that all the three factors are 
responsible.  
Still there is one question left- what could be economically and socially 
reasonable way of distributing profit and gains from growing value of the 
company between those factors? 
If we take a look at the „Land”, we know that it is compensated by rent 
and this factor does not become more productive if specific incentives are 
provided. 
Similar situation is if we look at the factor „Capital”. Borrowed capital is 
compensated by interest and also does not become more productive if 
specific incentives are provided. When we come to the capital that is 
invested by owners we may say again that it does not become more 
productive if specific incentives are provided. At the same time it should be 
compensated by profits as investor undertakes risk of loosing it. But then 
still another question is left- who should be owners of the capital? 
When we approach factor of production „labor” we can argue that it is 
compensated by wage. At the same time it is heavily responsible for earning 
profits, especially if role of combination of factors, sound management and 
innovation in enterprise is attached to this factor (as Goldfinger suggests). 
And at last but not at least – factor „labor” becomes more productive if 
certain incentives are provided. 
Thus we could argue that some combination or profit sharing among 
capital owner and labour and even share ownership by labour is sound and 
honest solution. Besides we could argue that capital owner could be 
particularly interested in profit sharing with labour and share ownership by 
employees given understanding of incentives that these schemes would 
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provide to productive factor labour which is heavily responsible for 
achieving profits and growing value of the company.  
There are several further arguments defending social and economical 
efficiency of employee financial participation. It is believed that it provides 
for greater equality in the distribution of income and wealth. It also 
improves relations between employees and capitalists. In nowadays it is 
even considered as part of a new culture of industrial relations based on 
innovative managerial strategies and more flexible remuneration policies, 
which should ultimately result in increased enterprise efficiency.  
Further arguments for come to the fact that employee control of 
enterprises will succeed where state control has failed in equalizing power 
and wealth and in decreasing worker alienation and exploitation. These 
advantages are particularly stressed within the context of property owning 
democracy (or peoples’ capitalism), which ought to ensure more widespread 
ownership than traditional capitalism. 
Motivation aspect is also very important here – the change from a 
system of guaranteed wages in which rewards are independent of effort, to a 
system providing employees with a part of income directly linked to 
enterprise performance, will increase individual motivation and 
commitment, and will provide for greater identification of employees with 
the interests of their firm, thus resulting in higher labour productivity and 
improved overall enterprise efficiency. Making employees partial owners of 
the firm may improve the system of monitoring individual workers.  
Employee ownership can also induce wage moderation as enterprises 
introducing employee ownership may be able to offer lower wages. Employee 
ownership can thus also lengthen the duration of employment contracts and 
reduce labour turnover. Employee ownership can also reduce inequality in 
the distribution of income and wealth, thus leading to reduced intra-firm 
conflict. 
To be also critical, there are some arguments to be mentiond that 
provide threats for company’s efficiency if employee participation schemes 
are introduced.  
First is so called “free rider problem” – since each worker will receive 
only a small fraction of any additional income due to his own effort, workers 
will be tempted to free-ride. 
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The second argument is connected with property rights- it is believed 
that emplyee ownership weakens property rights, leading to the dilution of 
the capitalist’s incentives and may compromise their motivation, discretion, 
power, or authority. 
At last, it contains also high degree of risk for labour. Because of the 
physical impossibility of diversifying the use of their labour in different 
sectors and enterprises (as capitalists can do with their capital), by putting 
„all eggs in one baskiet”, workers will not only bear the risk of 
unemployment but will also face additional income risk. Thus, if the firm 
goes bankrupt, they will lose not only their jobs but their savings as well.  
 
Conclusions 
Compensation for providing labor from profit and increased value of 
the company has not been provided in classical and neoclassical economic 
schools which considered three factors of production – land, labor and 
capital. J.A.Schumpeter who introduced the fourth factor of production in 
the first part of 20th Century – enterprise or entrepreneur spirit – also did 
not envisaged any channeling of profits to labor. He argued that the profit is 
a reward for innovation by the entrepreneur – the innovation gives the 
entrepreneur an advantage over his rivals, which enables him through the 
use of new methods, to earn a profit for him. Most of contemporary 
textbooks on entrepreneurship today support the idea of four production 
factors. 
Still today we can observe some theoreticians returning to the idea of 
having just three factors of production saying that it is possible to conduct 
productive process without the fourth factor – entrepreneur.  
It is believed that the traditional role of entrepreneur can be effectively 
switched to the labor. If not fully then at least partially. This idea is closely 
related to the phenomena called employee financial participation. 
The concept of employee financial participation has strong economical 
and social background as factor labor becomes more productive if additional 
incentives are provided and is heavily responsible for profit making in 
companies. There are further social arguments mostly connected with 
wealth sharing and idea of people’s capitalism, as well as economic 
arguments mostly connected with increased motivation of employees and 
thus increase of company’s efficiency.  
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